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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to privacy is the right to be left alone, a right to be free from
unreasonable intrusion or interference with private affairs, a right to
avoid public disclosure, even if truthful, of private facts.' The right of
privacy which every individual possesses has more recently been ac-
knowledged by the Supreme Court of the United States. 2 The advent of
the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic has placed a
considerable strain on its victims' rights of privacy. If this right is not
carefully protected, AIDS victims' constitutional rights of privacy may
become illusory.3
The existence of AIDS was first discovered in 1981, mainly afflicting
homosexual males and intravenous drug users.4 This problem is becoming
more intensified every day as it spreads to the heterosexual community
and, more importantly, to innocent newborn infants.5 Estimates of the
future course of the epidemic illustrate that by the end of 1991 there will
be a cumulative total of more than 270,000 cases of AIDS in the United
States alone, with more than 74,000 of those occurring in 1991.6 The
Public Health Service also projects that the vast majority of AIDS cases
will continue to come from the currently recognized high-risk groups.'
I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
3 See Privacy of AIDS Patients: Confidentiality Giving Ground to Society's Fears,
N.Y. Times, July 30, 1987, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter Privacy of AIDS Patients].
4 Conte, Hadley & Sande, Infection Control Guidelines for Patients with the
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 740 (1983).
1 W. DORNETrE, AIDS AND THE LAW ix (1987) [hereinafter AIDS AND THE LAW].
'INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS:
DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH 8 (1986) [herein-
after CONFRONTING AIDS]. See also Tenfold Increase in Aids Death Toll is Expected
by '91; Illness Likely to Rise Among Heterosexuals and Spread in Nation, U.S.
Predicts, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
'CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 6, at 8.
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However, they estimate that the new AIDS cases acquired through het-
erosexual contact will increase from 1,100 in 1986 to almost 7,000 in
1991.8 The magnitude with which AIDS may affect our nation is severe.
It has the potential for becoming a full-scale epidemic affecting all aspects
of both our lives and our communities. While reviewing this article, the
reader must keep in mind that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
have estimated that 1 to 1.5 million people in the United States are
infected with the AIDS virus.9 The risk of abuse of the constitutional
rights of the AIDS carriers, therefore, should not be considered in the
context of the 46,000 cases of AIDS patients presently diagnosed in the
United States. 0 Instead, it should be considered in the context of the 1.5
million people in the country who are believed to be infected with the
AIDS virus.
In addition to illness, disability, and death, AIDS has evoked fear in
the hearts and minds of most Americans: fear of the AIDS virus and fear
of the unknown. This fear has caused many Americans to act irrationally
towards AIDS and its victims." Legislatures across the country are at-
tempting to enact legislation which would place the rights of those af-
flicted with the AIDS virus in a very questionable position. 12 The
Constitutional guarantees of AIDS carriers cannot be set aside in the
face of arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable legislation. 3
This article will analyze the different legislative acts intended to curtail
the spread of the disease and whether these enactments will aid or merely
hinder the containment of the AIDS virus. It will illustrate potential
conflicts this legislation poses to the AIDS victims' constitutional rights
of privacy and liberty. At its conclusion, it will illustrate that with ra-
tional proposals, much more modified disclosures, education, and coun-
seling, the AIDS epidemic can be curtailed much more successfully.
There have been various forms of legislation enacted in the different
states which were intended to curb the spread of the AIDS epidemic and
to help public officials analyze the course of the disease. This paper will
8Id.
Centers for Disease Control, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the
United States, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT No. 49 (1987).
10 Id.11 E.g., Author and editor William F. Buckley, Jr. has suggested that everyone
detected with AIDS should be tattooed in their upper forearm and on their but-
tocks to protect unwitting needle users and homosexuals. Buckley, Identify All
the Carriers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1986, at 27, col. 3. A professor at the University
of Nebraska College of Law issued a controversial call for mandatory AIDS testing
for the entire population of the United States. Professor Stirs AIDS Controversy
With a Call for Universal Testing, Nat'l L.J., May 5, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
12 See Privacy of AIDS Patients, supra note 3. Dozens of states have considered
laws to identify and track both victims of the disease and carriers of the virus,
a step rejected by the Federal Centers of Disease Control as intrusive and costly.
Id. at D20, col. 2. The Illinois Legislature alone passed 17 AIDS-related measures,
including several which require health care providers to report the names of all
carriers to school officials and employers. Id. at D20, col. 6.
13 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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be limited to the reporting and confidentiality statutes of various states.
Also, it will analyze the potential for the imposition of mandatory public
health measures which states may impose, in particular, mandatory test-
ing and quarantine measures.
II. REPORTING AND CONFIDENTIALITY STATUTES
Every state requires health care providers to report selected identified
patient information to state agencies. 14 Reportable information may in-
clude venereal diseases, violent injuries (e.g., gunshot wounds) and in-
juries from child abuse or neglect. The principle of notifying authorities
about cases of communicable diseases has been upheld since 1887.15 Those
statutes reflect the state legislature's judgment that a patient's interest
in the confidentiality of his medical condition is outweighed by another
societal interest. 16 Reporting statutes have rarely been challenged in the
courts.17 A typical reporting statute concerning communicable diseases
will list certain infectious diseases which must be reported and then
include a catch-all phrase such as, "any other disease dangerous to the
public health."'8 Therefore, general statutes concerning the required re-
porting of communicable diseases have the potential for requiring phy-
sicians and other health care providers to report the identity of persons
diagnosed as having the AIDS virus.19
Presently, in the United States, seven states have enacted statutes
requiring a health care provider to report the identities of those people
14 Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physicians in the
Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. REV. 255, 274 (1984) [hereinafter Pre-
scribing Privacy].
11 Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274,
1288 (1986).
16 Prescribing Privacy, supra note 14, at 274.
,7 See Damme, Controlling Genetic Disease Through Law, 15 U.C. DAvIs L.
REV. 801, 807 (1982).
"1 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 19a-215 (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 139.2
(West 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.06 (Baldwin 1982).
19 Query whether this would require physicians to report those people diag-
nosed as being, HIV antibody-positive, or to report those having the CDC's def-
inition of AIDS.
The ELISA serum antibody test for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (here-
inafter HIV) is useful for screening purposes and in epidemiologic AIDS research.
This test has no diagnostic, prognostic, or predictive value. A confirmed positive
test indicates that a person may have been exposed to the virus and has mounted
an immunologic response (the HIV antibody). This test must be supplemented by
further testing to demonstrate that there are not antibodies to other viruses that
cross-react in the test. Therefore, when a person has received a test result of HIV
antibody-positive, this result could be a false positive result for the virus asso-
ciated with AIDS and really be a result as to an antibody's reaction to another
type of virus. See Landesman, Ginzberg & Weiss, The AIDS Epidemic, 312 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 521 (1985).
The criteria for diagnosing AIDS is much more complicated and is being refined
every day for the CDC. It is as follows:
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diagnosed as carrying the HIV antibody.20 The Colorado statute, enacted
June 8, 1987, is believed to go the furthest with regard to reporting by
physicians.21 It is the first reporting statute with criminal sanctions
against doctors who do not forward the names of patients with the virus.
22
Generally, these statutes require reporting the name, age, and address
of those persons diagnosed as being HIV-antibody positive. 2 Reporting
statutes have been highly criticized for deterring patients from seeking
medical treatment, infringing upon the physician-patient relationship,
advancing discrimination against those individuals reported, and ulti-
mately causing the AIDS disease to become more widespread rather than
fulfilling their purpose of containing the disease.
24
While seven states have enacted statutes which require reporting of
every person diagnosed as having the HIV antibody, two states have gone
further and enacted statutes which require the reporting of those patients
1) The presence of a reliably diagnosed disease at least moderately predictive
of cellular immunodeficiency. Specific diseases are necessary to diagnose
AIDS and these may include one or more of the following:
a) Certain malignant tumors, such as
(1) Kaposi's sarcoma in patients under 60 years of age; or
(2) non-Hodgkins lymphoma;
b) Certain infections by protozoa, such as
(1) Pneumocystic carinii pneumonia;
(2) cryptosporidium diarrhea; or
(3) toxoplasmosis gohdii infection,
c) Certain infections with fungi, such as(1) candida species; or
(2) cryptococcus neoformans;
d) Certain infections with viruses, such as
(1) cytomegalovirus;
(2) herpes virus;(3) hepatitis virus;
e) Certain infections with bacteria, such as(1) mycrobacterium tuberculosis; or
(2) other atypical mycrobacterium
2) The absence of an underlying cause for the immunodeficiency or of any
defined cause for reduced resistance to disease.
For a thorough explanation of the CDC's definition of full-blown AIDS, see
Closen, AIDS: Testing Democracy - Irrational Responses to the Public Health
Crisis and the Need for Privacy in Serologic Testing, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835,
861 (1986) [hereinafter AIDS: Testing Democracy].
Recently the CDC has expanded the criteria for diagnosing AIDS. However, it
should be clear that a diagnosis of HIV antibody-positive and a diagnosis of AIDS
are two very different things.
20 AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 349. Those states are Arizona, Colorado,
Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, South Carolina and Wisconsin. Id.
21 See Armstrong, AIDS Disclosure Hotly Debated, Christian Science Monitor,
June 18, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
22 COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1409 (1987).
23 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-1402 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 441.210 (Supp.
1987).
24 Gerberding, Recommended Infection - Control Policies for Patients with Hu-
man Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1562 (1986); Lam-
bert, On AIDS: We Have More Answers than Questions, N.Y. Times, July 12,
1987, at E30, col.1; Knudson, Colorado Is Split on New AIDS Law, N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1987, at A13, col. 1.
[Vol. 37:2
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol37/iss2/7
CONTAINING THE AIDS VIRUS...
who may be a "health threat to others."25 A person who is a health threat
to others is described as someone who has been diagnosed as having a
communicable disease and negligently or willfully acts in such a manner
as to promote spreading the disease. 26 These statutes appear to address
the problem of reporting HIV antibody-positive individuals on a wide-
scale basis by limiting the reporting to those individuals, who in the
physician's good faith belief, seem to be recalcitrant or careless about the
public health of others.
Many states have recognized the potential abuse that recorded medical
information may pose to those affiliated with the AIDS virus. In response
to this recognition, these states have enacted or are in the process of
enacting confidentiality laws specifically addressing AIDS which are de-
signed to protect the confidential nature of this medical information.
2 7
California and New York, the states with the highest caseload of AIDS
patients, have declined to enact reporting statutes due to their potential
for inciting discrimination. 28 Both of these states, however, have enacted
legislation directed toward the confidentiality of medical information con-
cerning individuals diagnosed as having AIDS or carrying the HIV an-
tibody. 2
9
The reliability of these confidentiality statutes as well as the confiden-
tial nature of all medical information has been called into question re-
peatedly in the past decade.30 The Executive Director of the American
Medical Records Association told the Privacy Protection Study Commis-
sion that "a complete medical record [today] may contain more intimate
details about an individual than could be found in any single document."
3 1
The House Committee noted that there is a growing use of medical in-
formation by those who are not directly engaged in providing medical
25 E.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.4175 (Supp. 1988). These statutes are directed toward
carriers of venereal disease, inasmuch as AIDS is a venereal disease and HIV
antibodypositive individuals are presumed to be carriers, these regulations are
construed so as to apply to AIDS carriers. See AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5,
at 349.
26 MINN. STAT. § 144.4172 (Supp. 1988).
27 See State Legislatures Grapple with Bills on AIDS, American Med. News,
June 26, 1987, at 35. There are presently eleven states which enacted statutes
designed to protect the confidential nature of this information and twelve states
which have introduced this type of legislation in 1987. Id.
Also, according to an American Medical Association legislative expert, confi-
dentiality is governed in most states, if not all, by existing state regulations on
sexually transmitted and communicable disease. Id. at 36. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 140.3 (West 1972); TEx. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. art. 4419b-1, § 3.06
(Supp. 1988).
28 Lambert, On AIDS: We Have More Answers than Questions, N.Y. Times,
July 12, 1987, at E30, col. 1.
29 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2776(2) (McKinney 1985). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19203
(Supp. 1987).
30 See H.R. REP. No. 832, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 (1980) [hereinafter HousE
REPORT]. See also Prescribing Privacy, supra note 14.
31 Prescribing Privacy, supra note 14, at 258.
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services to patients. 2 Also, most medical records today are kept on com-
puter data recording systems, and, while these information systems are
essential to the growth of the economy, it has been recognized that they
can be misused to create a dangerously intrusive society.3 3 This massive
accumulation of personal medical information is a particular concern to
many individuals today because of its potential to lead to abuse of this
information by unauthorized disclosure.3 4
The reasons for these fears in our society concerning the accumulation
of medical information are not groundless. The House Committee has
accumulated evidence suggesting that there has been nationwide traf-
ficking in medical information.35 They have found that at least one com-
pany, Factual Services Bureau, Inc., engaged in a nationwide business
for over 25 years obtaining confidential medical information without the
consent of the patient.3 6 This company was based in Denver, Colorado.37
A report made by the Denver grand jury issued to the Privacy Protection
Study Commission noted that the evidence of the problem concerning the
privacy of medical records in their jurisdictions also exists in many cities
and jurisdictions across the nation.3 8 This evidence leads to the conclusion
that there can be no guarantee that medical information will remain
confidential.
The effect that disclosure of medical information will have on a person
related to the AIDS virus can be devastating. If this information is made
known, AIDS victims have the potential of being discriminated against
by forcing them from their schools, discharging them from their jobs
(including military service), depriving them of custody or visitation with
their children, refusing them insurance for life and health coverage, de-
nying them medical and nursing home care, denying aliens permanent
resident status, and the list goes on.39 Compulsory reporting may also
32 HousE REPORT, supra note 30, at 19. Aside from medical care providers,
medical information is used by private and governmental health insurance plans;
public health agencies; medical and social researchers; rehabilitation and social
welfare programs; employers; life and casualty insurers; federal, state, and local
health planning agencies; schools; courts; law enforcement agencies; credit in-
vestigation companies; accrediting, licensing and certifying agencies; the press;
and others. Id.
33 Id.
See Cooper, Physician's Dilemma: Protection of the Patient's Right of Privacy,
22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 397, 402 (1978) [hereinafter Physician's Dilemma].




19 See Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 87-CIV-2040 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 25,
1987) (Plaintiff was denied life insurance on the basis of testing HIV antibody-
positive); Laredo v. Southwest Community Health Services, Inc., No. CIV 86-1313
(D. N.M. filed Oct. 29, 1986) (Nurse demoted after testing positive for HIV an-
tibody); Leckelt v. Terrebone Hosp., No. 86-4235 (E.D. La. filed Sept. 29, 1986)(Termination of nurse due to fear that she had or would develop AIDS); C.C.'s
Children v. Dade County School Bd., No. 86-1513-CIV (S.D. Fla. filed July 18,
1986) (Haitian triplets barred from classroom after being diagnosed with AIDS-
related complex); In re N, No. 22656 (Cir. Ct., Escambia Cty., Fla., Juvenile Div.)
[Vol. 37:2
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lead toward abuse due to the fact that the information will be accumulated
over a number of years.40 Victims of the AIDS virus should be able to
have some guarantee that this confidential information will remain con-
fidential. 41 If no guarantee is available, the legislature ought to review
its reasons for enacting these reporting statutes in light of the dangers
of public disclosure. The main reasons cited for enacting reporting stat-
utes are to curb the spread of the disease and to keep apprised of the
progress of the disease.4 2 Yet, if people are aware of these reporting re-
quirements, and are also at risk for possessing the HIV antibody, then
most of those people will not seek treatment for fear of disclosure, dis-
crimination and the social stigma placed upon their families. 43 The pur-
pose of these statutes would be undermined by the nature of the statute
itself.
A. The Physician-Patient Relationship
Another dilemma which arises due to the enactment of reporting stat-
utes is the nature and extent of the physician-patient privilege. The phy-
sician-patient privilege did not exist at common law. It is strictly a
(A 14-year-old boy was confined to a mental ward to prevent him from spreading
AIDS); Keller v. Great White Bhd. of the Iron Fist, No. 87 L 11807 (Cir. Ct.,
Cooke Cty., Ill. filed May 29, 1987) (neighbors and friends denounce petitioners
due to their possibility of carrying the AIDS virus); Doe v. Doe, No. 78 D 5050
(Cir. Ct., Cooke Cty., Ill.) (Suit to deprive divorced father of visitation rights based
on fear that he may be a carrier of the AIDS virus); Doe v. Cinacola & Sons
Excavating, No. 86-320825NZ (Cir. Ct., Oakland Cty., Mich. filed Nov. 1986)
(Plaintiff was terminated from employment and all his health and life insurance
benefits were terminated after he was diagnosed with AIDS); McEnancy v. Four
Seasons Nursing Center, No. 409241 (Dist. Ct., Travis Cty., Tex. filed Dec. 2,
1986) (An AIDS patient sought injunctions against a nursing home that refused
him admission solely because of his medical condition.)
40 Surgeon General C. Everett Koop has stated that there will be no cure or
vaccine for AIDS in the foreseeable future. Dr. Koop Warns of Spread of AIDS,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at sec. III, p. 11, col. 1. Therefore, the number of people
diagnosed as being HIV antibody-positive could become overwhelming consid-
ering the fact that presently 1.5 million people are estimated as being carriers
of AIDS.
41 Confidentiality could be promoted by requiring anonymous reporting using
a numerical system. States may also require reporting only those cases of actual
AIDS patients applying the standards of the CDC. This method would require
less reporting, less data and therefore less potential for abuse.
42 See Knudson, Colorado Is Split on New AIDS Law, N.Y. Times, June 15,
1987, at A13, col. 2; Bolfey, Reagan Urges Wide AIDS Testing, N.Y. Times, June
6, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
, See Landesman, Ginzburg, & Weiss, supra note 19, at 521. See also Ger-
berding, Recommended Infection - Control Policies for Patients with Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus Infection, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1562, 1563 (1986);
Lambert, On AIDS: We Have More Questions than Answers, N.Y. Times, July 12,
1987, E30, col. 1; Knudson, Colorado is Split on New AIDS Law, N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1987, at A13, col. 1 (A Denver attorney representing a coalition of
homosexual and civil rights groups remarked "[u]ltimately this bill [reporting
statute] is going to kill people.").
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statutory privilege.44 This statutory privilege primarily prohibits courts
from forcing a physician to divulge confidential information during ju-
dicial proceedings without the patient's consent.45 We are not concerned
here with the statutory privilege between patient and physician. Rather,
we are concerned with the nature of the physician-patient relationship.
The relationship between a physician and his patient has always been
recognized as extremely confidential. 46 Protection of physician-patient
communications is necessary to assure free and open disclosure by the
patient to the physician of all information necessary to establish a proper
diagnosis and to provide adequate medical treatment. 47 Protecting the
confidential nature of such communications is also desirable to alleviate
the patient's fear of possible humiliation, embarrassment or discomfort. 48
For this reason, the courts have characterized the relationship between
physician and patient as fiduciary in nature. 49
A fiduciary relationship is founded on trust or confidence reposed by
one person in the integrity and fidelity of another.50 It may constitute a
breach of the physician-patient relationship, a breach of confidence, or
an invasion of privacy to divulge information acquired through the phy-
sician-patient relationship. 51 However, this privilege is not absolute. The
fiduciary relationship and its pledge of confidentiality has been qualified
by exceptions from compulsory disclosure and protection of society as a
whole. 52 The confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship will be
of utmost importance in helping to curtail and contain the spread of AIDS.
Persons at risk of possessing the virus will be more likely to obtain
medical advice and treatment if they are assured of non-disclosure. 53
The growing number of required reporting laws raises another dilemma
for the physician. Does the legal requirement to disclose otherwise con-
fidential patient information require the doctor to disclose to the patient
the reporting requirements before any treatment ensues? If the physician
informs the patient that he must report his name to the proper health
authorities if he is diagnosed as being HIV antibody positive, the patient
will most likely refuse treatment. The patient may also seek treatment,
but only on the condition that the physician not report the disease, or he
may not return for future treatments.54 Avoidance of these undesirable
consequences is a primary reason why confidentiality is important in the
treatment process,55 especially with the prospective AIDS patient whose
disclosure may be devastating to his psychological as well as social char-
acter.
- R. MORRIS & A. MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW, 141 (5th ed.
1971).
45 Id.
- AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 253.
41 Physician's Dilemma, supra note 34, at 398.
4 Id.
49 AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 253.
50 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 321 (5th ed. 1983).
51 AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 254.
52 Physician's Dilemma, supra note 34, at 399.
See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
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Since the reporting statutes enacted in several states would constitute
an exception to the physician-patient confidentiality standard, these stat-
utes must be analyzed as to their constitutionality and their ability to
achieve the purpose of containing the spread of the disease. The Supreme
Court of the United States and various courts of the individual states
have always upheld the principle that the state's police power in pro-
tecting the public health of its citizens will circumvent any individual
constitutional guarantees. However, the state's action must be reasona-
ble. It cannot be arbitrary, oppressive, or discriminatory.56
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy in Medical Information
The Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe, acknowledged a constitutional
right of privacy in the disclosure of medical information.5 7 In that case,
patients and their physicians challenged the New York State Controlled
Substance Act's requirement that the names and addresses of all recip-
ients who had been prescribed certain drugs be recorded in a centralized
computer file. The patients argued that the mere existence of the infor-
mation in a readily available form violated their fourteenth amendment
right of privacy because the possibility of the information being made
public caused some patients to be reluctant to use the drugs and some
doctors reluctant to prescribe the drugs.5 The district court held that the
doctor-patient relationship is one of the zones of privacy accorded con-
stitutional protection and that the patient identification provisions of the
Act invaded this zone with a "needlessly broad sweep.
'59
The Supreme Court rejected the lower court's analysis. 0 The Supreme
Court established that the cases characterized as protecting privacy have
involved two different kinds of interests.61 The first is the right of an
individual not to have his private affairs made public by the government.
62
The second is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions.
63
In analyzing the first type of privacy interest, the Court illustrated
three ways in which public disclosure of patient information could come
about.64 First, health department employees may violate the statute by
failing either deliberately or negligently to maintain proper security.
Second, a patient or a doctor may be accused of a violation and the stored
66 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905).
67429 U.S. 589 (1976).
18 Id. at 578-600.
19 Id. at 596.60Id. at 598.
' Id. at 599.
62 Id. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1976). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
"429 U.S. at 600.
1989]
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1989
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
data may be offered in evidence in a judicial proceeding. Third, a doctor
or the patient may voluntarily reveal information on a prescription form.6 5
The Supreme Court found that the third possibility would exist under all
types of reporting legislation and the possibility of its occurrence was not
relevant to the validity of the statute.68 The other two possibilities were
dismissed by the Court based upon the lack of evidence in the record as
to any improper administration of the security provisions of the reporting
statute by the state of New York.67
When analyzing the risks of public disclosure with respect to AIDS
patients, these possibilities cannot be so easily discarded. 68 Most states
do have confidentiality laws protecting unauthorized disclosure of medical
information, some specifically directed toward AIDS medical informa-
tion.69 Therefore, one would hope that the second or third possibility would
never occur in the United States.70 The occurrence of the first possibility
is a potential threat in the United States. Unlike Whalen, there has been
documented evidence concerning the misuse of private medical infor-
mation.7 1 Every American citizen, including the carriers of the AIDS
virus, is entitled to privacy in their personal affairs, free from government
intrusion.72 The devastating effects that public disclosure would have on
an AIDS patient's life would render their right of privacy much more
significant than a person's right to privacy concerning the knowledge of
their drug prescription. 73 Therefore, the legislatures ought to be certain
that this information will remain confidential. If confidentiality cannot
be guaranteed, the courts must scrutinize the reporting statutes in light
of the damaging effects which disclosure will have on the AIDS carriers'
right to privacy. 74
65 Id.
"Id. at 600-601.
67 Id. at 601-602.
6The effects that disclosure may have on an AIDS patient may be devastating,
therefore, these possibilities must be given serious consideration by the courts.
6f9 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
70 Most confidentiality statutes prohibit the use of this type of information in
a judicial proceeding. Also, in the case of an AIDS victim, voluntary public dis-
closure is highly unlikely due to the devastating consequences.
71 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
7 The Supreme Court has characterized the right of privacy in making deci-
sions free from unjustified governmental interference on matters relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing and
education. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
This right of privacy should extend to the right to make decisions concerning
an individual's health and treatment, especially when considering a fatal disease
such as AIDS which carries devastating effects if this information is disclosed.
7" See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Being labeled a drug addict may
place some stigma on a person's life, but this stigma is minimal compared to the
disastrous effects which the AIDS stigma carries.
74 See Whalenv. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,607 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan illustrates the thin line which reporting of the use of Schedule II drugs
approaches with respect to the deprivation of the patient's right of privacy. If the
drug reporting statute contained a risk of disclosure of confidential information,
Justice Brennan concludes that this would amount to a deprivation and the state
would have to prove a necessity to promote a compelling state interest.
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The second type of privacy interest which the Court illustrates is the
interest in independence of making certain kinds of important decisions.5
Justice Stevens recognized that some patients will avoid needed medical
attention due to concerns for their own privacy.76 He states, however, that
the number of people refusing to use Schedule II drugs was not significant
enough to prove that the reporting statute had violated any interest in
their independence of making important decisions.
7 v
The AIDS carriers' avoidance of needed medical attention is an entirely
different scenario than the situation concerning the required reporting
of the use of Schedule II drugs. Even though it would be difficult to prove
the effect that reporting statutes would have on potential carriers of the
AIDS virus,78 it is evident that the knowledge of the reporting statutes
would deter potential AIDS carriers from seeking medical diagnosis and
treatment. 79 The consequence of deterrence would render the statute
counterproductive in its efforts to curb the spread of the disease. This
required reporting of HIV antibody carriers woild deprive potential car-
riers of their privacy interest of independence in making the important
decision of seeking medical diagnosis and treatment.
The Supreme Court in Whalen held the statute constitutional on the
grounds that a state must be allowed to experiment with concerns of
public health and, also, because the law was rationally related to the
legitimate state interest of regulating drug abuse. 80 In doing so, the Court
applied a minimum rationality test to reporting statutes. A minimum
rationality test has been applied by the Court when there is an ordinary
Constitutional right involved.8 ' In order for a statute to be held valid
under a minimum rationality standard, the means employed by the state
must be appropriate, the purpose must be legitimate, and the means must
be rationally related to the end.
82
76 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1976).
76 Id. at 602-603.
71 Id. at 603.
71 It would be difficult to prove because it requires proof of a negative. The
nature of the proof would be the number of people who are in a high-risk group
of having the virus, measured against those who refuse to seek diagnosis or
treatment. Reports have shown, however, that over 46,000 cases of AIDS have
been reported to the CDC since 1981 and between 1 million and 1.5 million people
in the United States are estimated as being infected with HIV. Centers for Disease
Control, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States, 36 MOR-
BIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT No. 49 (1987). It would be impossible to
determine how many of those estimated 1-1.5 million people fear having the virus
but have a greater fear of information being disclosed and, therefore, will not
seek treatment.
79 See supra note 43.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1976).
"I The minimum rationality test was first established by the United States
Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The
ordinary constitutional right governed by a minimum rationality standard can
be contrasted with the strict scrutiny test applied by the Court when there is a
fundamental constitutional right at issue. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
This two tiered standard of review was first enunciated in dictum in United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
82 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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The Whalen Court held that the means employed were appropriate due
to the extensive security precautions employed during the course of re-
porting the prescriptions. 3 The Court did recognize, however, that vast
amounts of personal information in massive government files poses a
definite threat to the privacy of individuals reported.M This possibility
was held not to exist in the Whalen case.85
The purpose of the statute in requiring reporting of specific drugs was
also found by the Court to be legitimate.86 The New York legislature was
attempting to curtail the unlawful use of certain prescription drugs. The
district court found that the state did not sufficiently demonstrate the
necessity for the patient-identification requirement.8 7 The Supreme
Court, however, held that the means employed could attain the purpose
of deterring the unlawful use of prescription drugs.88 Emphasis was also
placed on the state's broad latitude in experimenting with possible so-
lutions to problems of vital local concern.8 9
In applying the minimum rationality test to the reporting statutes
presently enacted, the means would be to require physicians and other
health care providers to report the identity of those patients testing HIV
antibody-positive. 9o The purpose would be to protect the public health of
the citizens of their respective states by curbing the spread of the disease
and tracking the course of the epidemic.91 It is difficult, however, to con-
ceive how the means and the end are rationally related. The evidence
that this information cannot be guaranteed confidentiality,92 the social
stigma which follows those associated with the AIDS virus93 and human
nature all lead to the conclusion that there is no rational relation. People
will be more likely to avoid medical treatment if there is a possibility
that they will be connected to the AIDS virus.94 If this occurs, the statute
will be counterproductive, causing more people at risk of having or con-
tracting the disease to remain uninformed about AIDS and more likely
to continue to spread the disease.95
The courts, in analyzing the reporting statutes, could place emphasis
upon the state legislatures' broad latitude in experimentation. 96 If the
state is afforded broad latitude in experimentation concerning the AIDS
epidemic, it could be disastrous for our society, especially potential AIDS
carriers. Considering the estimate of the CDC that 1.5 million people are
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602, 607 (1976).
84Id. at 605. See also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570,
576 (1980).
85 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1976).T6Id. at 591.
'7 Id. at 596.
8 Id. at 598.
89Id.
90 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
91Id.
92 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
'3 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
ISee supra note 43 and accompanying text.
Id.
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presently carrying the AIDS virus,97 experimentation by the state leg-
islatures could damage, maybe even destroy, the lives of an overwhelming
number of people in our country. The Whalen Court points out that the
legislative process remains available to terminate an unwise experi-
ment.98 The tragedy of the court's rationale is that several thousands of
people's lives may have been adversely effected by this "experiment"
before the legislature decides that they have made a mistake. Potential
AIDS carriers deserve much broader protection of their constitutional
rights.
The privacy right in medical information was analyzed more recently
in Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi.99 In this case, a group of psychi-
atrists were challenging the constitutionality of a state statute that au-
thorized the inspection of offices and records of medical providers to detect
evidence of fraud. The court determined that the statute unnecessarily
intruded into the patient's right to make medical decisions and enjoined
enforcement of the statute. 100
The significance of this court's decision is that, unlike Whalen, the court
found the doctor-patient relationship to be within those fundamental
rights guaranteed constitutional protection.
101 The court recognized that
the doctor-patient relationship, specifically the right of independence in
making medical decisions, was within the bounds of fundamental rights
because these communications often concerned areas that are already
protected such as, marriage, procreation, family, parenthood, sexuality
and physical problems. This automatically brought into question the sec-
ond level of the two tier analysis employing a test of strict scrutiny.
10 2
Strict scrutiny analysis requires the party asserting the validity of the
statute to prove a compelling state interest.
10 3 If a compelling interest is
found, the state must show that there were no less burdensome alter-
natives. 0 4
The court found that the state's interest of preventing medicaid fraud
was legitimate but it was not compelling enough to significantly intrude
into the patient's right to make decisions regarding medical care.
05 The
court illustrated that much less burdensome alternatives could be im-
plemented.
0 6
91 Centers for Disease Control, supra note 9.
18 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1976).
" 481 F. Supp. 1028 (1979).
'00 Id. at 1043.
lo' Id. at 1038.
102 Id. at 1043. Cf. Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978). The Schach-
ter court emphasized security precautions to guard against disclosure of this
information and did not consider the confidential nature of the physician-patient
relationship.
103 In regards to AIDS legislation, it may be very difficult to prove a compelling
state interest at this time. Exactly what amounts to a compelling state interest
is evolving in the court system. Each case must be analyzed according to its own
facts. It must be guided by reason and justice and not by fear and anxiety. See
AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 135.
104 E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
108 Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1043 (1979).
I The court considered the alternative of having the physicians delete the
confidential information from the file before it is reviewed. Id. at 1042.
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The patient's right to make decisions concerning medical diagnosis and
treatment should also be considered a fundamental right entitled to con-
stitutional protection. The disclosures necessary to detect AIDS, the dev-
astating effects the disease will have on one's personal life and the
intimacy of the doctor-patient relationship in this situation all concern
areas that the Supreme Court has already protected. 0 7 The grave im-
portance for confidentiality coupled with the tragedies which accompany
this disease mandate the protection of a citizen's constitutional guaran-
tees.
Applying the strict scrutiny analysis to the compulsory reporting stat-
utes concerning AIDS carriers, it is apparent that the state could employ
less burdensome alternatives in an effort to further protect the AIDS
victim's right of independence in making medical decisions. The com-
pelling state interest of protecting public health can be preserved by other
less intrusive means. The state could require reporting those cases of
full-blown AIDS by applying the Center for Disease Control's criterion
of diagnosis.1o8 Further, compulsory reporting could be accomplished by
a numerical system, thus avoiding any identity disclosure. This could
preserve the intention of following the progress of the disease. The state
could then follow the state of Minnesota's example and require reporting
of the recalcitrant victims of AIDS. 10 9 This would help to curb the spread
of the disease. Employing these less intrusive alternatives would give
those people with a high-risk of having the disease more incentive to seek
medical treatment. They would not have to fear public disclosure unless
they were themselves careless and endangering the public health.
The intent of the legislature in enacting compulsory reporting of those
who test positive for the HIV antibody is to be commended. They have
the interest of the public health in mind. However, the nature of the AIDS
virus has instilled fear in American society. Those individual rights in-
herent in the Constitution must not be carelessly set aside because the
rationality and reason of American citizens has given way to this fear.
AIDS affects a variety of persons, including victims who are
entitled constitutional guarantees and persons who must ul-
timately be responsible to one another to help fulfill those guar-
antees. If the federal or state governments seek to modify those
guarantees through the legislative process, it is the duty of the
citizens to be alert and to exercise their power at the ballot
box. But if the legislature still promulgates statutes that fail
to observe the quality of liberty guaranteed by the state and
federal constitutions, it is the responsibility of the courts to
review those statutes. The legislature and the courts were de-
signed to work for persons, and they were designed to work
together. 110
107 This disease concerns all aspects of a person's life, including, but not limited
to, marriage, procreation, family, parenthood, sexuality and physical problems.See Hawaii Psychiatric Soc'y v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028, 1038 (1979).
101 See supra note 19.
109 See supra note 25. A recalcitrant person is one who refuses to obey authority,
custom, or regulation. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1184 (2d ed. 1974).110 AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 133.
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The disease can be contained, but the best way to do it is not by un-
necessarily depriving citizens of their constitutional guarantees. It is
through education, counseling and voluntary guidance which will help
to stop the spread of this disastrous epidemic.'
III. MANDATORY PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES: COMPULSORY
TESTING AND QUARANTINE
The fear which the AIDS epidemic has instilled in American society
has given rise to far-reaching proposals by respected and influential peo-
ple in our society. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina has called for
the imposition of quarantine measures upon HIV antibody carriers."
2 A
professor of law at the University of Nebraska, among others, is urging
mandatory testing of AIDS victims on a wide-scale basis.
1 3 These irra-
tional proposals, implemented by well-respected people in the community,
pose a serious threat to the liberty interests of the potential AIDS carriers.
The threat can only increase as the epidemic becomes more wide-spread.
The scope of this article cannot begin to encompass all the proposals
directed toward the AIDS epidemic. This article will, however, discuss
those proposals which seem to be the most far-reaching and intrusive.
This portion of the article is devoted to the issues of whether the gov-
ernment has the power to order such mandatory measures, and, if so,
what the limits of their authority are in restricting a person's right to
liberty. The conclusion will be that the government can enforce manda-
tory testing and quarantine but their authority is not universal, rather
it is limited to only those measures absolutely necessary.
Most, if not all jurisdictions, have given public officials the necessary
authority to implement public health measures."
4 The federal legislature
has enacted laws which authorize the President, acting on the recom-
mendation of the National Advisory Health Counsel and the Surgeon
General, to designate communicable diseases for which mandatory ex-
aminations and quarantines may be implemented."1
5 On December 22,
1983, President Reagan designated the following as contagious diseases:
cholera or suspected cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague,
suspected smallpox, yellow fever, and suspected viral hemorrhagic fevers
(lassa, marburg, ebola, Congo-crimean, and others not yet isolated or
named). 116 AIDS has not yet been added to this list of infectious dis-
, See AIDS: Testing Democracy, supra note 19. See also Note, The Constitu-
tional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (1986).
112 Lambert, On AIDS: We Have More Answers Than Questions, N.Y. Times,
July 12, 1987, at E30, col. 1.
113 Seib, Debate Rages Over AIDS - Test Policy, Wall St. J., June 18, 1987, at
33, col. 2; Professor Stirs AIDS Controversy With a Call for Universal Testing,
Nat'l L.J., May 5, 1986, at 25; Mandatory AIDS Testing Draws Fire, Nat'l L.J.,
Mar. 9, 1987, at 3.
114 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3195 (West 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-221 (West 1986); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2120 (McKinney 1985);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. art. 4419b-1. (Vernon Supp. 1988).
- 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1982).
116 Executive Order No. 12,452, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1983), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
264 app, at 68 (Supp. 1987).
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eases.'1 7 The President's order consequently allows for the apprehension,
examination, and quarantine of persons afflicted with these diseases. 118
A. Compulsory Testing
Compulsory vaccination and immunization laws have been upheld by
the courts since the early 1900's. 119 The courts have repeatedly recognized
the principle that the police power of the state to preserve the public
health is not limited by the constitutional guarantees of life, liberty, and
property, if this power is exercised reasonably and fairly and is not abused.
The Supreme Court has not reviewed the constitutionality of manda-
tory vaccination and immunization since Jacobson v. Massachusetts was
decided in 1905.120 The Jacobson Court found that the state maintained
the power to enact mandatory vaccination laws based upon its inherent
police power. The Court however, held that this police power cannot be
exercised to contravene the Constitution of the United States, or infringe
any right granted or secured by the Constitution.121 The Court held that
the law in question applied equally to all citizens of Massachusetts and
was based on the informed judgment of the appropriate health officials.
The laws concerning vaccination and immunization can be analogized
to the laws concerning mandatory testing for possible carriers of the AIDs
virus in that both scenarios concern an invasion of the body in times of
a public health epidemic. Vaccination and immunization, however, are
imposed to halt the spread of a disease. These actions virtually prevent
disease from spreading in the community. 122 Mandatory testing for the
AIDS virus can only detect which persons may be infected with the dis-
ease. 23 Testing for the AIDS virus in itself can in no way prevent the
disease from spreading."24 It may help health officials educate and counsel
those found to be HIV antibody positive, but even that may be a ques-
tionable rationale for imposing mandatory testing.125
Furthermore, any wide scale mandatory testing for AIDS would not be
based on the informed judgment of health officials. Many national health
117 AIDS is expected to be added to this list. See S. REP. No. 88, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987).
Il 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1982).
119 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Brown v. City School
Dist. of the City of Corning, 104 Misc. 2d 796,429 N.Y.S. 2d 355 (1980); Veimeister
v. White, 179 N.Y. 235, 72 N.E. 97 (1904). Also, every state except two (Delaware
and Iowa) requires immunization of public school students. See AIDS AND THE
LAW, supra note 5, at 67.
120 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
121 Id. at 25.
122 The very nature of a vaccination or immunization is the resistance to a
protection against a specified disease. It enables the body to build up immunities
to prevent disease. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 702, 1566 (2d ed. 1974).
,2 See AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 66. The test to determine the
presence of HIV antibodies was developed for the purpose of protecting the blood
supply. Landesman, Ginzburg & Weiss, supra note 19, at 523.
124 The test is merely used to determine if the HIV antibody is present.
125 See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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officials have denounced mandatory testing for AIDS. 26 They claim that
the procedure would be unmanageable and cost prohibitive.
127 Instead,
national health officials urge spending this money on voluntary test sites
where people who are at risk of carrying this disease may come for
testing.128 The proposals for imposing mandatory testing can therefore be
deemed against the advice of the experts and ultimately unreasonable.
129
Proposals for mandatory testing to determine the existence of the HIV
virus can be better analogized to the mandatory drug testing laws being
imposed by the government at the present time. On September 15, 1986,
President Reagan signed an Executive Order entitled the "Drug-Free
Federal Workplace."13 0 This order mandated the random administration
of drug testing for all federal employees in sensitive positions involving
national security, law enforcement, and public safety. As a result of the
imposition of this random drug testing, the courts have been flooded with
lawsuits denouncing this imposition of testing as a violation of the per-
son's fourth amendment right.'3 ' The courts have reviewed these actions
on the basis of their reasonableness under the fourth amendment stand-
ards.132 The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures vests individuals with the right to be free from arbitrary
and unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expecta-
tions of privacy. 33 The following analysis will focus on the illegality of
mandatory screening for the HIV antibody applying the same method
used by the courts when considering mandatory drug testing cases.
The Supreme Court has held that the involuntary taking of blood con-
stitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
126 S. REP. No. 83, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1987) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
127 Id. at 10.
121 Id. at 8.
129 However, many states have legislation pending in their respective states
for mandatory testing of certain groups such as, premarital testing, prenatal
testing, prisoners, food handlers, hospital patients and others. See State Legis-
latures Grapple with Bills on AIDS, AMERICAN MED. NEWS, June 26, 1987, at 35.
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop promotes voluntary testing, claiming that
most of these categories do not contain people at high risk for the disease, there-
fore, it would merely be an unnecessary waste of time and money. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 126, at 8. See also Landesman, Ginzburg & Weiss, supra note
19, at 523.
1o Executive Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987). President Reagan pro-
mulgated this Executive Order pursuant to the authority granted by Congress
in 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1982).
121 See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole, 670 F. Supp. 445
(D.D.C. 1987); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp.
726 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Capua v. City of Plaintfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
112 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
I" See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
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ment. 34 Therefore, one can conclude that the testing of persons for the
HIV virus would constitute a search under the fourth amendment. 13.
The fundamental requirement of the fourth amendment is that a search
must be reasonable. 138 Ordinarily, a search requires both a warrant and
probable cause in order to be deemed reasonable.'37 The Supreme Court,
however, has held that the absence of either element would not auto-
matically render the search unreasonable.1 38 Instead, the Supreme Court
has applied a balancing test 139 between the intrusiveness of the search
and its promotion of a legitimate governmental purpose. 140
The Supreme Court has measured the degree of intrusion of a search
by the individual's expectation of privacy."" In determining a legitimate
expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court has implemented a two-step
analysis. First, the person must have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, the expectation must be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 14 As measured by the
expectation of privacy, inspections of personal effects are generally less
intrusive, while breaches of the "integrity of the body" result in the
greatest invasions of privacy.143 Justice Brennan found that the interests
of human dignity and privacy compel the finding that mandatory blood
extractions are greatly intrusive.11 The extraction and analysis of blood
forces people to divulge private, personal medical information unrelated
to the government's interest in discovering the presence of drugs, alcohol
or related substances. 14
'3 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
135 The reason is that the test is implemented by the taking of a blood sample
and in mandatory testing cases this taking is involuntary.
3r See New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
17 Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (1986). The SupremeCourt has established some exceptions to the warrant and probable cause re-quirements. These exceptions are either exigency based exceptions, Terry stops,
or the adminsitrative and regulatory search exceptions. See Note, A Proposal forMandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civilian Employees, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 322,334 (1987). None of these exceptions would apply to the searches imposed for
testing of the HIV antibody.
131 See New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Capua v. City of Plainfield,
643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986).
13 Before the balancing test was established, the Court applied the traditional
rule of probable cause plus a warrant. The essential requirement under this test
was a reasonable suspicion directed at the person to be searched. See Note, supra
note 137, at 337. Mandatory testing for the HIV antibody would fail under thetraditional test as there would be no reasonable suspicion directed toward the
particular person being tested.
141 See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 650 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507(D.N.J. 1986).
141 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
142 Id.
143 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Capua v. City of Plainfield,
643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986).
14 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
"I See Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514 (D.N.J. 1986);McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Iowa 1985) (The court notesthat it is significant that both blood and urine can be analyzed in a medicallaboratory to discover numerous physiological facts about the person from whomit came including, but hardly limited to, recent ingestion of alcohol or drugs.)
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The mandatory taking of blood for purposes of detecting the presence
of the HIV antibody can also be considered a search and seizure under
the fourth amendment. 46 There is a reasonable expectation of privacy
inherent in one's blood content.147 Even if the government were to restrict
the analysis of blood to the presence of the HIV antibody, it would still
violate this privacy expectation. Society will be prepared to recognize this
expectation as reasonable,' 48 unless the government can guarantee that
this information will remain confidential.1
49
The second aspect of this balancing approach is the promotion of the
government's legitimate purpose in imposing the search.6 0 The courts
have repeatedly upheld state actions performed within their police power
to protect the public health. However, this power must be exercised rea-
sonably.
There are many drawbacks to imposing mandatory testing for the pres-
ence of the AIDS virus. The main drawback is that the test is not reli-
able.16 ' The AIDS test was established to prevent the spread of the AIDS
virus through the blood supply. This test is best utilized to detect the
presence of the AIDS virus in blood, tissue, donated organs, and sperm. 152
The reason is that these items may be discarded without psychologically
or socially endangering anyone. It has been recognized, however, that
this test should not be used to screen people on a wide-scale basis for
AIDS.1 3 When it is imposed on a wide-scale basis, not within any high-
risk groups, the number of false positive diagnoses increases. 54 Some
people think the number of correct positives could equal the number of
false positives. 51 This would cause needless psychological and emotional
distress on those diagnosed falsely. Therefore, the experts believe that
146 This is based on the Supreme Court conclusion that the involuntary taking
of blood constitutes a search and seizure under the fourth amendment. Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
147 Id.
148 Most public health officials denounce the idea of mandatory blood taking
for the purposes of detecting the HIV antibody. See supra notes 126-129 and
accompanying text.
149 The elements of confidentiality have also been recognized as important in
the random drug testing cases. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Dole,
670 F. Supp. 445, 449 (D.D.C. 1987); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp.
1507, 1515 (D.N.J. 1986).
1-0 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Mar-
quez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
5 ' See SENATE REPORT, supra note 126, at 10; AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note
5, at 66; Gostin, Curran & Clark, The'Case Against Compulsory Casefinding in
Controlling AIDS - Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 AM. J. OF L. AND MED.
7, 11 (1987); Okie, AIDS 'False Positives': A Volatile Social Issue, Wash. Post,
July 23, 1987, at A3, col. 1.
12 AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 66; Landesman, Ginzburg & Weiss,
supra note 19, at 521.
113 SeeSENATE REPORT, supra note 126; AIDS: Testing Democracy, supra note
19, at 874.
154 See Landesman, Ginzburg & Weiss, supra note 19, at 521; Gostin, Curran
& Clark, supra note 151, at 12.
115 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 126, at 30, 42; Landesman, Ginzburg &
Weiss, supra note 19, at 521.
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this test should only be implemented on people who are believed to be at
high-risk for the disease and then only on a voluntary basis. 56
The reason public health officials are calling for voluntary testing is
due to their belief that people will avoid seeking medical diagnosis and
treatment if it is imposed on a mandatory basis. 157 This would undermine
the government's purpose of imposing mandatory testing. Instead of de-
tecting more people who are carriers of the disease, these people will
avoid the testing centers altogether. Thus, public health officials will be
unable to determine the extent of this epidemic.
In employing the balancing test currently used by the Supreme Court
to determine the reasonableness of the search, 15 8 it is apparent that man-
datory testing for the AIDS virus would constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure under the standards of the fourth amendment. The govern-
ment is implicating a legitimate purpose in testing for the AIDS virus.
However, mandatory testing would not promote the governmental inter-
est in curbing the spread of the disease or in keeping up with the progress
of the disease.'5 9 The test's tendency to indicate significant false positive
results 160 and the subjects tendency to avoid mandatory testing will only
render the government's actions counterproductive. The government's
purposes would be much better served if they would put the money toward
voluntary testing sites and enact measures toward keeping the results
of the AIDS tests confidential.16 1
The public health benefit of such a mandatory screening program is
likely to be minimal when compared to the personal and economic costs
of implementing such a program. 62 The objective of compulsory testing
is to detect those people who may be carrying the HIV antibody in order
to help them modify their behavior so as to stop the disease from spread-
ing. This can be implemented in a much more efficient manner. The
government should implement a comprehensive voluntary program of
public health education, professional testing and counseling services.
Those people in high risk groups are more likely to respond to cost-free,
voluntary programs, thus promoting the governmental interest more ef-
ficiently. This type of voluntary program would achieve the same public
health advantages as mandatory programs, however, none of the signif-
icant detriments of a compulsory program would be present.'16
156 See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
"' See AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 175.
See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
159 See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
160 Id.
161 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 126; Colburn, Illinois, Louisiana Become
First State to Require AIDS Test Before Marriage, Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 1988, at
All, col. 1. The federal Center for Disease Control and Surgeon General C. Everett
Koop have opposed mandatory testing but favor voluntary testing, combined with
public education and counseling.
112 The cost of the ELISA antibody test and associated expenses for donated
blood products alone amount to approximately $100 million per year. This amount
does not include the expense of testing individual persons to detect the HIV
antibody. Landesman, Ginzburg & Weiss, supra note 19, at 523.
163 See Gostin, Curran & Clark, supra note 151, at 20.
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B. Quarantine
Another means in which states have utilized their police power in
protecting public health is through the use of quarantines.16 4 Virtually
every state, as well as the federal government, has enacted legislation
which would give public health officials the power to impose quaran-
tines. r5 With the onset of the AIDS epidemic, respected public officials
are calling for the imposition of quarantine measures. 16 Therefore, a
review of the state's power to impose quarantine is mandated.
Health officials began to use quarantine powers early in the history of
the United States to prevent the spread of infectious disease. 6 7 One must
remember that this use of quarantine was at a time in history when
sanitation and medication were not as advanced as they are today. Later
in our history, quarantines were imposed against prostitutes for the pur-
pose of preventing the spread of venereal disease. 68 Today, quarantines
or involuntary confinement are mainly imposed against those people who
are found to be mentally unstable 69 or those found to be infected with a
contagious disease and are recalcitrant or careless about spreading the
disease to others in the community.170
Quarantine in our society has never been held unconstitutional by the
courts. 17 1 The courts have always upheld the principle that the liberty of
the individual must sometimes be restricted for the good of the commu-
nity.1 72 However, the AIDS epidemic poses a new dilemma to the concept
of quarantine.
16 Quarantine measures have been imposed in the past for, among other things,
scarlet fever, venereal disease, tuberculosis and mental instability. See, e.g., State
v. Snow, 230 Ark. 746, 324 S.W.2d 532 (1959) (tuberculosis); Moore v. Draper, 57
So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952) (tuberculosis); People v. Tait, 251 111. 197, 103 N.E. 750
(1913) (scarlet fever); Ex parte Caselli, 62 Mont. 201, 204 P. 364 (1922) (venereal
disease); Greene v. Edwards, 164 W. Va. 326, 263 S.E.2d 661 (1980) (tuberculosis).
165 E.g. 42 U.S.C. § 264(d) (1982); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3195 (West
1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a221 (West 1986); IowA CODE § 139.5 (1972);
N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW § 2120 (McKinney 1985).
- See On AIDS, We Have More Answers Than Questions, N.Y. Times, July
12, 1987, at E30, col. 1.; AIDS and the New Apartheid, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1985,
at A30, col. 1; Quarantine Considered for AIDS Victims, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1984, at
17.
167 For a thorough discussion of the history of quarantine measures see Parmet,
AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTE L. REV.
53 (1985).
168 Id. at 66.
169E.g. Benham v. Ledbetter, 785 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1986); Harris v. Ballone,
681 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
170 See State v. Snow, 230 Ark. 746, 324 S.W.2d 532 (1959); Moore v. Draper,
57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952); Greene v. Edwards, 164 W. Va. 326, 263 S.E.2d 661
(1980). Most state statutes authorizing quarantine today only apply to those
persons who are infected with a communicable disease and are recalcitrant. See
supra note 165 and accompanying text.
171 See Parmet, supra note 167, at 75.
172 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); People ex rel. Bar-
more v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815'(1922).
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In the past, quarantines have been imposed by the courts with the
reservation of the right of the detained person to apply to the court for
review after a significant period of incubation.173 With most of these quar-
antines, the disease was such that the person confined would recover and
be permitted to go free.1 74 With AIDS carriers, however, the situation is
quite different. At this point in time, there is no cure for AIDS. 75 There
is not even the hope of a vaccine for AIDS in the foreseeable future. 176
Therefore, the imposition of quarantine on those people found to be HIV
antibody-positive would be an extreme measure indeed, especially since
the incubation period for the virus could be as long as seven years. 177 This
would mean placing under quarantine people who are basically healthy
and able to function in everyday life. 78 This deprivation of liberty would
definitely be unconstitutional according to current standards.179
The imposition of a quarantine on those AIDS patients who refuse to
change their behavior after receiving notification of their infection would
most likely not be viewed by the courts as an unconstitutional deprivation
of liberty.18 0 These AIDS carriers would pose a definite threat to the public
health by carelessly spreading the disease.'9 ' The state would have a
compelling interest in protecting the public health by confining those
people who refuse to change their behavior. Also, there would be no less
burdensome alternatives if this person has already been educated and
'" See, e.g., Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952); Varholy v. Sweat, 153
Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943); People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422,
134 N.E. 815 (1922).
174 But see People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Il1. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922)(Woman confined to her home for an indefinite period of time due to infection of
typhoid bacilli); Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.W. 387 (1909) (woman afflicted
with leprosy was to be under quarantine for the remainder of her life).
I' Koop, Surgeon General's Report on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,
256 J.A.M.A. 2783, 2784 (1986).
"16Dr. Koop Warns of Spread of AIDS, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1988, at sec. III,
p.11, col.1.
17 Centers for Disease Control, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in
the United States, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. 49 (1987).
"' This would not be the first time a quarantine order had been issued for
basically healthy people. See People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422,
134 N.E. 815 (1922); Varholy v. Sweat, 153 Fla. 571, 15 So. 2d 267 (1943). This
would be an unrealistic goal, however, due to the projected 1.5 million people
thought to be carrying the HIV antibody.179The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny analysis to those state stat-
utes which would deprive a person of a fundamental constitutional right. The
state must prove the existence of a compelling state interest that could be ac-
complished by no less burdensome alternatives. Education and counseling of these
individuals would be one less burdensome alternative.
18 This would be in harmony with the Minnesota statute which requires re-
porting of those infected with a contagious disease who may be a threat to the
public health. MINN. STAT. § 144.4175 (Supp. 1987).
... Scientists have concluded that the disease can only be spread through sexual
contact, the sharing of an unsterilized needle, from mother to fetus, and contam-
inated blood transfusions. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 7. Therefore, a
person who has knowledge of their infection but continues to conduct himself in
a careless manner, possibly spreading the disease to others, would constitute a
threat to the public health.
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counseled on the danger of the AIDS virus. Therefore, the imposition of
quarantine measures against those AIDS carriers who refuse to modify
their behavior seems like a probable action that states may implement
in the near future.
In the midst of the fear and prejudice 82 which the AIDS epidemic has
instilled in many American citizens, it must not be forgotten that even
recalcitrant AIDS victims are entitled to their constitutional rights of
due process. One state Supreme Court has recently held that those people
suspected of requiring quarantine are still entitled to their due process
rights. 18 3 This court has found that a recalcitrant patient charged under
the Tuberculosis Control Act must be afforded adequate written notice
detailing the grounds and underlying facts on which the commitment is
sought, the right to counsel, the right to be present, to cross-examine,
confront and present witnesses, the standard of proof must be by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence, and the right to a verbatim transcript
of the proceedings for purposes of appeal. M The deprivation of liberty in
an AIDS situation is much more severe than most previous cases con-
cerning the quarantine of infected individuals. 185 Therefore, the due proc-
ess rights of AIDS patients should be afforded careful protection by the
courts.
The imposition of quarantine in the case of AIDS carriers is a very
extreme measure. Therefore, the proposals for the quarantining of AIDS
carriers should be modified to only those cases in which the patient refuses
to change his behavior and then only after they have been given appro-
priate counseling and education about the disease.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fear in a society can do many things. We must be careful in addressing
the appropriate actions to be taken concerning the AIDS epidemic re-
membering our Constitution and what it stands for. It stands for liberty
and justice. We must remember this and not let the fear and prejudice of
the AIDS epidemic make us lose sight of it.
The reporting statutes which many states have imposed may work
against the purpose of the legislature in enacting them. People will fear
public disclosure and the devastating consequences this disclosure may
bring. Experts are projecting that there will be 270,000 cases of full-
blown AIDS by 1991. This may mean that over two million people will
be carriers of the HIV virus. With numbers of this magnitude, it will be
182 Prejudice is usually directed toward homosexuals and intravenous drug
users as they constitute the majority of AIDS carriers and make up the two highest
risk groups. See Landesman, Ginzburg & Weiss, supra note 19, at 523.
IRS Greene v. Edwards, 164 W. Va. 326, 263 S.E.2d 661 (1980).
18 Id. at 663.
This deprivation of liberty would most likely be for the remainder of the
person's life. See supra notes 175-179 and accompanying text.
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quite difficult for public officials to keep the results of these reporting
statutes confidential. Statutes, therefore, should be modified to require
reporting only of those patients who are recalcitrant and report cases of
HIV antibody-positive individuals by using a numerical system, thus
preserving anonymity. In this way, confidentiality will be better protected
and the purpose of the statutes will be preserved.
Mandatory testing on a wide-scale basis will not be successful in curbing
the spread of the disease. This measure will do more harm than good due
to the nature of the test itself and the violations it may have on the
citizens' constitutional rights. Voluntary testing of those people who fear
contagion will be more cost effective and will serve the government's
purpose more efficiently.
The imposition of quarantine on a wide-scale basis would not be re-
alistic, especially when considering that there will be millions of AIDS
carriers in our society before there will ever be a cure. However, the use
of quarantine for those individuals who refuse to change their behavior
for the protection of the public health may be necessary. If quarantines
are imposed, these people must be afforded their constitutional rights of
due process.
In any case, the best route which society may take in preventing the
spread of AIDS is through counseling, education and compassion for those
who are afflicted.
At the beginning of the AIDS epidemic, many Americans had
little sympathy for people with AIDS. The feeling was that
somehow people from certain groups "deserved" their illness.
Let us put those feelings behind us. We are fighting a disease,
not people. Those who are already afflicted are sick people and
need our care as do all sick patients. The country must face
this epidemic as a unified society. We must prevent the spread
of AIDS while at the same time preserving our humanity and
intimacy. 186
LUANN A. POLITO
11 AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at i.
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